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NATIONBUILDING 101:  REDUCTIONISM IN PROPERTY, LIBERTY, AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
  Without straining the biosphere nor credulity, it is perfectly possible for each 
person to have as a full a measure of property as Bill Gates has,
1 and having property, 
one also enjoys liberty, for properly understood, the two terms are virtually synonymous. 
2 Indeed, James Madison, fourth American president and secretary to the Constitutional 
Convention, wrote an essay for the Boston Gazette in which he asserted that Americans 
have a “very dear” property in their liberty. 
3  Property is the hub of Western legal 
systems and the foundation of the modern private market, 
4 and the problems of corporate 
governance that beset not only Russia’s emerging economy but also the economies of 
advanced nations everywhere are little more than enforcement challenges to an effective 
property system.  Nationbuilders who would grasp the essential basis of Western 
prosperity and freedom can do no better than begin with a reductive focus on property. 
  By training, scholars and practioners who labor in the vineyards of the common 
law tend to be splitters rather than lumpers.  Instead of unifying legal doctrines to 
promote conceptual understanding, they divide them into exceptions and distinctions, 
separating contract from property, tort from contract, criminal law from civil law, public 
regulation from private law, and substance from procedure.  What is cohesive about the 
volumes of common law particularities is lost in a tangled labyrinth of cases that lawyers 
have argued ― and judges, decided ― by distinguishing holdings from dicta and one 
holding from another in ways often achieving a triumph of result at the expense of clarity 
of form.
5  How confusing this all must be when nationbuilders attempt to understand 
what is important about the rule of law, and no wonder that restraint is counseled to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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nationbuilders in less developed countries lest they attempt wholesale importation of 
Western legal systems to secure a framework for their own regulation. 
6   
  At the same time there is growing apprehension that something in the interstices 
of Western legal systems in both common and civil law is materially responsible for the 
prosperity of Western nations, 
7 which in terms not only of general per capita income but 
also of per capita income of their poor, creates wonder and envy worldwide.  For both 
humanitarian and practical political reasons, no more burning issue exists in the 
international community than how to help the world’s impoverished nations along a 
peaceful path toward prosperity, but if this path insofar as we best know entails the 
inculcation of Western legal concepts, then which specific concepts need inculcating and 
why these particular concepts assume great importance.  I argue that reductionism is in 
order, the reducing of quite complex legal doctrines and rules to an essential principle 
that societies which wish can embrace with some certainty that it carries the maximum 
potential for producing the greatest wealth of nations.  “Property” is that essential 
principle necessary for generating the likelihood for prosperity, and this essay asserts that 
prosperity within the recognized constraints of a strong property system also supports 
liberty and advances the possibility for sustainable peace. 
    The first section of the essay begins with a discussion of the human plight of 
limited resources, followed by a development of how Western nations have addressed 
that plight and becomes prosperous through the incentive of property, which is defined as 
a legal exclusion over resources, a definition that is at odds with the deconstructed legal 
view of property as a bundle of rights.  The equal property right of others limits an 
owner’s use of her resources, and the resources protected by property are traditionally William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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subject to eminent domain and taxation.  Acknowledging the difficulties inherent in how 
nationbuilders determine who owns initial acquisitions of natural resources like land, the 
section still emphasizes that property’s success as a wealth generator depends on its 
strong enforcement, broad applicability, and general stability. The section concludes with 
a story about human nature that argues why the institution of property may naturally 
foster production of greater new resources than systems based on compulsory sharing 
with strangers. 
8  
  Section two maintains the close semantic connection between the right of 
property and the right of liberty, a connection widely recognized during the American 
colonial period and embodied in the U.S. Constitution.  It continues the reductive theme 
by explaining that both property and liberty are exclusionary terms applying to the 
protection of one’s resources, including the most basic facultative resources of self, and 
suggesting that property is best grasped as a civil right like freedom of speech or religion. 
9  The third section ties in the important issue of corporate governance to the project of 
reductionism and maintains that the implementation and enforcement of a strong property 
system is necessary both to protect owners from managers and to secure the resources of 
the public and of other members of society from the power of large business 
organizations, 
10 while at the same time the system enables the relatively unrestrained use 
of private resources  subject only to the equal property right of others  that 
characterizes the framework for maximum new resource generation.  It also explains how 
environmental protection, employment discrimination prohibitions, and worker health 
and safety regulation fit within the property framework. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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  As broad social prosperity creates perhaps the most substantial likelihood for 
sustainable world peace, an understanding of the mechanism for prosperity ought to 
demand the closest attention and debate, and the essay concludes by reaffirming that the 
reduction of that mechanism to the legal institution of property furthers this debate of 
utmost importance.  Before continuing, I must confess one caveat: in no measure does the 
essay attempt to engage in philosophizing to justify property as a right, or unequal 
resource accumulation as a result, being content merely to assert that property is in fact 
the necessary foundation for maximum resource production and leaving to nationbuilders 
the decision whether or not and to what extent to institutionalize property. 
PROPERTY AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
Poverty, Prosperity, and Limited Resources 
  Poverty is widespread throughout the world. 
11  Almost a quarter-million children 
die weekly of poverty-related disease and malnutrition, 
12 and the hopelessness and 
despair that accompany poverty is accounted a major impetus to war and terrorism. 
13  At 
the same time, prosperity exists among a minority of the world’s nations, 
14 creating a 
tremendous income disparity between the world’s poorest and richest, with the people of  
Bangladesh living on a fifth of the per capital income of those in China, 
15 which have 
only a forty-fifth the per capita income of the United States population. 
16  The discord, 
jealousy, and suffering inherent where there are vast national disparities of resources 
makes imperative an understanding of how such disparities have arisen and how poverty 
can be ameliorated.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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  A variety of explanations have attempted to account for national disparities in 
wealth.  One that has not withstood the test of time is dependency theory, which holds 
that exploitation makes some countries prosperous, while leaving others 
poor. 
17  Whatever the abuses of colonialism or capitalism to indigenous populations, 
they do not seem to account for why some colonial nations grew wealthy and others did 
not, nor why the formerly enslaved in some countries eventually prospered while in 
others those who had been neither enslaved nor colonized remained poor. 
18  Nor do 
better educational systems, greater natural resources, ideal population densities, or 
superior personal values materially account for why some nations develop and grow rich 
and others do not. 
19 Analysis suggests that “the large differences in per capita income 
across countries cannot be explained by differences in access to the world’s stock of 
productive knowledge or to its capital markets, by differences in the ratio of population to 
land or natural resources, or by differences in the quality of marketable human capital or 
personal culture.” 
20 
  Mexico and the United States both enjoy fertile, mineral-rich land masses with 
similar population densities, yet one is relatively poor while the other is quite 
 prosperous. 
21  East and West Germany, formerly politically separate but joined by 
common culture and highly educated populations, nevertheless presented during their 
years of separation stark contrast in per capita income, as does North and South Korea 
today.  
22  With the world’s oldest and most populous social culture, China possesses only 
a small fraction of the Gross National Income (hereinafter GNI) of the United States, a 
country barely 200 years old. 
23  Defeated nations left with devastated resource bases and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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infrastructures at the end of World War II now rank among the world’s wealthiest while 
nations untouched by that war remain mired in historic poverty. 
24 
  Anthropologist Jared Diamond maintains that the broad, relatively unobstructed 
land mass of Europe permitted the rapid diffusion of new agricultural techniques from 
Southwest Asia and that abundant agricultural production accounts for the subsequent 
specialization and organization of knowledge that enabled Western prosperity to 
dominate the world technologically and militarily. 
25 Although sufficient food does 
enable specialization and organization, agricultural techniques and fertile land are not in 
themselves materially adequate incentive to ensure maximum food development and 
production. 
26  They do not explain Japan’s prosperous economy in spite of its 
comparatively weak agriculture, 
27 nor do they account for the countries of Europe and 
Asia that have had agricultural techniques and fertile lands available for centuries but 
nonetheless remain poor. 
28 
  For much of the past fifty years, the world’s wealthiest countries, primarily 
identified as “the West,” have approached less-developed countries as though the answer 
to weak economies lay in various technical and financial aid grants. 
29 This model for 
assisting wealth production proceeds from the assumption that modern Western 
economies are founded on an infrastructure of roads, dams, and energy facilities 
30 and 
that grants, loans, and technical expertise from the West to provide these advantages 
should catalyze less developed populations in creating sounder economies. 
31 Alleviation 
of sickness, hunger, and illiteracy through various forms of aid also fits this model, and, 
of course, such alleviation often indicates humanitarian impulse while at the same time it 
fosters a healthier, more nourished, better-educated human economic resource. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
  7
  Unfortunately, much of this foreign aid has disappeared through corruption or was 
misapplied or failed in any event to stimulate the development of organic, prosperous 
economies. Even large aid projects involving dam construction and road building create 
only short-term job opportunities, and infrastructure when completed and technology 
when introduced often by themselves fail to give adequate incentive for investment and 
risk taking necessary for sustained new resource production and healthy economies.  
Humanitarian aid is vital but in the absence of a growing economic self-sufficiency, 
humanitarian aid is a temporary answer to world poverty.  After fifty years, aid programs 
have failed to reach the roots of poverty in much of the world, 
32 and the result:  
disillusionment, discontent, despair, domestic revolution, and recently, international 
terrorism. 
  Privatization of economies through the marketplace has recently been pushed as 
an alternative to aid programs or at least a supplement priming economic growth and 
ending the poverty of nations. 
33  This view sees state planning of resource production as 
primarily responsible for stagnant, poor economies and the lack of general productivity in 
communist and socialist nations as inducing the decline of state planning worldwide in 
the last years of the twentieth century.  Free populations to pursue their own economic 
ends and the private market will emerge, capitalism will coalesce, and a growing 
prosperity will inevitably follow. In spite of the flexibility and responsiveness of the 
private market in guiding resource flows, privatization alone or in combination even with 
substantial foreign aid does not seem adequate to create vibrant economies. 
34   Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and privatization in substantial sectors of the Russian William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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economy, gross domestic product declined forty percent in the ensuing seven years while 
corruption, violence, fraud, and theft flourished. 
35 
  In part, views concerning the causes of poverty and the achievement of prosperity 
are shaped by the perception that we live in a world of limited resources, 
36 but although 
in some sense the resources of the world are finite, in important ways they are infinite 
and to argue the contrary is to miss the importance of human effort and ingenuity as the 
resource par excellence.  For instance, land is limited in its physical dimension, but the 
uses of land are virtually without limit and each use is a resource requiring human effort.  
By itself land produces little to sustain human wants and needs, saving only a few fruits, 
nuts and berries, the occasional edible creature, and trees for firewood and construction, 
but even these resources must be picked, hunted, and chopped, i.e., to realized them 
requires application of the further resources of human effort and knowledge.  Likewise, 
to develop the materials under the earth ― various minerals that are often regarded as 
limited ― requires locating, drilling, pumping, mining, and quarrying for them to be of 
any use as resources and these steps are usually only the initial ones in creating further 
resources.  At each stage the process is dependant on human effort and ingenuity. 
  The achievements of the Information Age 
37, which encompass not only 
computers and the Internet, but also technological innovations generally, including 
agricultural advances from the plow to genetically modified foodstuffs, derive not from 
anything that is limited but from human effort in the organization, development, and 
diffusion of knowledge resources.  Resources  defined as anything humans may need 
or want  are primarily limited in a moment of time, not over the long span, and their 
existence both at any single moment and over time depends on the effort and ingenuity of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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people.  Economies are not most productively constituted as lifeboats requiring equitable 
division of ever dwindling physical resources but as cornucopias whose plenty is induced 
primarily by the application of unlimited human resources. 
38  From these simplistic but 
accurate observations derives a truism:  if the social goal is to maximize production of 
any given resource, society must provide the greatest incentive to stimulating the human 
efforts (and ingenuity) that are necessary to producing that resource.  The issue becomes 
to identify and institutionalize that greatest incentive. 
Incentive and Property 
  The way to institutionalize incentive and create the maximum condition for 
national prosperity begins with the recognition that before it is possible to understand and 
predict resource flows in an economy, one must know how the law assigns rights within 
the economy. 
39  The legal system, its implementation and enforcement, furnishes the 
maximum incentive to human effort required to create modern private markets, engender 
capital formation, and facilitate trade, but not just any kind of legal system will prompt 
economic prosperity.  It must be a proper ― or property-based ― legal system. 
40 Only 
the strong, legal right of property creates potential for the maximum prosperity of nations 
and materially explains to nationbuilders in less-developed countries the economic 
success of the West.  Before examining the evidence for this assertion, it will be 
necessary to establish a meaning for the term “property.”   
1.  Property as the Right of Exclusion 
  Many political and legal commentators find the term “property” almost 
incomprehensible. 
41   The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences calls it “a euphonious 
collection of letters which serves as a general term,” 
42 and a prominent legal scholar William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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remarks:  “The paradigm of a Sanskrit verb of a thousand forms could not approach in 
diversities the phases of that concept in any single time and place.” 
43 Yet from the time 
of Aristotle, “property” has been associated with the incentive to produce new  
resources. 
44 Over and over commentators have observed that property gives an incentive 
to the inculcation of resources that other ways of approaching resource development do 
not. 
45  This repeated assertion suggests ― for these commentators at least― some 
essence that flows from the understanding of property that is continuous through history 
and may provide to nationbuilders a focus for construction of an economy with the 
potential for maximum resource development. 
  That essential understanding, however, is not easily found in the usual dictionary 
definition of property as “things that are owned.” 
46  In fact this definition may be 
responsible for much of the belief that property has no singular meaning. 
47  In Roman 
civil law property related only to tangible things, 
48 but in common law, perhaps dating to 
the recognition of the lease right in English feudal land practices, property also applied to 
things intangible. 
49  It is also true that in common and civil law new tangible and 
intangible things came to be protected by property.  For instance Mozart and Beethoven 
had no property in the copying of their music 
50 whereas today 2 Live Crew and the estate 
of Roy Orbison do have a property in theirs. 
51  If property is whatever things that are 
owned, and the things that are owned are subject to change and do change, then the 
concept is a shifting one from which nationbuilders can take little guidance. 
  On the other hand, if the emphasis of property is not on things (or resources), but 
on ownership, then the essential meaning of property relates to a right rather than to 
things, and if the right can be elucidated, nationbuilders can grasp the asserted basis for William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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why some nations have a pronounced lead over others in resource production.  The 
difficulty is that much legal analysis of property/ownership regards it as a bunch of 
“stick-like rights” rather than as a single right. 
52  Whatever the analytical virtues of the 
rights-splitting approach to common law legal scholarship, it is misleading to those 
seeking what in Western property law provides the greatest incentive to resource 
production.  The essence of property over time has not been that it is a bunch of sticklike, 
mostly positive rights but that it is a single right:  the right to exclude. 
53  Property is the 
legal right enforced by the state that permits the owner of a resource to prevent others 
from interfering with it. 
54 
  If an owner of a resource (one who has a property in it) can legally exclude others 
from it, the owner can possess it, control it, consume it, destroy it, or exchange it. 
55  The 
single negative right of exclusion unifies the disparate positive rights of property, which 
can now be thought of ways of using a resource, i.e., one can use it for personal 
possession, use it for consumption, use it in exchange for other resources, or use it as a 
gift.  The single negative right of exclusion captures the right to exercise all of the 
positive uses of a resource, 
56 and if the state limits or prohibits some particular use of a 
resource, it does not mean that no property exists in that resource — or that a new or 
different kind of property exists — for the property is not the resource but the right.  For 
example, if the state prohibits patients who buy prescription drugs from reselling or 
transferring them, it does not mean that these owners have no property in the drugs.  The 
right of exclusion still applies to keep others from interfering with the owners’ 
consumption or destruction of the drugs; the state has simply removed the right as it 
would allow the owners to exclude the state itself from interfering with the sale or other William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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transfer of prescription products.  Likewise, in an important sense one has property in 
one’s body in the right to exclude others from interfering with it, which ownership allows 
the positive sale of replaceable body parts like blood or hair but not of irreplaceable body 
organs like kidneys and corneas.  However, the exclusive owner does control whether or 
not to pass ownership of a kidney or cornea by gift.  The point is not to advocate the 
selling of body organs but to explain the nature of property as the right of exclusion, 
which right does not change in meaning (only in application) when society forbids or 
limits a certain type of resource development, e.g., marketplace trade in kidneys and 
corneas. 
57 
  The sociologist Emile Durkheim sought a cross-cultural criterion for the 
definition of property and concluded that it was the right of exclusion:  “[P] roperty is the 
right of a given individual to exclude other individuals and collective entities from the 
usage of a given thing.” 
58  Authorities from the U.S. Supreme Court 
59 to William 
Blackstone, 
60 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
61 and Thomas Hobbes 
62 have asserted that 
the essence of property is the right of exclusion.  Even if property also connotes things 
that are owned or a bundle of separable positive rights, its essential meaning understood 
through Western history is that an owner can exclude others from interfering with owned 
resources. 
63  As Professor Merrill maintains:  “Give someone the right to exclude others 
from valued resources . . . and you give them property.  Deny someone the exclusion 
right and they do not have property.” 
64  Thus, when commentators observe that 
“property” provides maximum incentive for resource development, they may be taken as 
referring to the legal right to exclude others from interfering with one’s resources, which 
right was protected and enforced through the early common law action for trespass. 
65 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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2.  The Incentive of Property and the Evidence Linking Property and Prosperity 
  The law of property is the deep foundation of the modern private market. 
66  The 
right of exclusion gives incentive to exchanges in the creation, production, and 
distribution of resources to such a degree that without it private trade is reduced to face-
to-face barter or trade with trusted friends and relatives. 
67  Without knowing who owns 
what, moving resources from those who have them to those who want and need them the 
most becomes excessively costly.  In his Nobel laureate address, economist Ronald Coase 
asserted that the legal system “has a profound effect on the working of the economic 
system and may in certain respects be said to control it.” 
68  Not any kind of legal system, 
however, engenders the greatest resource production but only “an appropriate system of 
property rights” does. 
69 
  If no private legal ownership exists, people have to guard the resources they 
control from strangers, and in such an instance the weaker always have resources subject 
to the predations of the more powerful. 
70  Without the right of property, no laws against 
theft and robbery protect one’s possession of resources.  No tort laws provide 
compensation for wrongful injury to one’s resources.  No laws of contract ensure that 
executory agreements for the transfer of owned resources can be enforced.  In the 
absence of the property right, both the raising of capital for resource development 
(borrowing for the conduct of business) and the private division and subdivision of 
resources become extremely difficult. 
71  It is no exaggeration to state, along with 
economist Hernando de Soto, that “[t] he hidden architecture of sustainable development 
is the law [of property].” 
72  The incentive that the law of property stimulates has enabled 
Western prosperity in resourceful productions ranging from agriculture to silicon chips.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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  The empirical evidence connecting the institution of property to national 
prosperity begins with the recognition that the Western nations  and a few Pacific Rim 
countries  have both the world’s highest per capita incomes and the world’s strongest 
exclusionary property systems. 
73  Although the connection could be coincidental, no 
feasible alternative explanation for such linking exists except than that strong property 
gives maximum incentive for the activities that create new resources.  Conversely, it is 
likely that the world’s least prosperous nations remain so because they lack adequate 
property law and its enforcement.  A 2002 study of “economic freedom,” which is 
acknowledged to be “an evaluation of property rights, broadly conceived,” 
74 concluded 
that nations with “very high protection” of property average $23,769 per capita in 1999 
purchasing power parity. 
75  Nations with “high protection” of property average $13,027 
per capita; then, “moderate protection,” $4,963; “low protection,” $3,010; “very low 
protection,” $2,651. 
76 A study of property-strong versus property-weak countries from 
1975 – 1995 found that countries which strengthened the property right the most during 
that period registered a 2.7% annual GNP growth, whereas those nations where the 
property right weakened most significantly averaged 0.6% annual GNP declines. 
77  An 
analysis in 1989 of all studies then available concluded that strong-property nations grew 
at three times the annual rate and were two and a half times more efficient than weak-
property nations. 
78 
  In explaining why “capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else,” 
79  
de Soto asserts that the signal difference — especially in the inventions and applications 
of technology — between the highly developed and prosperous Western countries and the 
less prosperous and less developed remainder of the world is that the Western countries William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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have possessed relatively strong property systems for at least two-to-three hundred years 
longer than the rest of the world. 
80  Even if the nations of the world started several 
hundred years ago at income parity, the property-weak countries would fall behind 
quickly if the property-strong countries grew only at a rate of two percent greater per 
year.  Allowing for disruptions of war and the changing of regimes, one can still see that 
compounding a two-percent annual advantage over a couple hundred years could easily 
account for the ten-fold income disparity that exists today between many property-strong 
and property-weak countries.  
81 
  Consider that the income disparity also translates to disparity in technology 
attainment, infrastructure development, and food, housing, education and health resource 
availability.  For nationbuilders the lesson seems clear:  institute a strong property in any 
resource to give incentive to its maximum production; to lower production of a resource, 
reduce the incentive to develop by weakening or eliminating the property right in it 
through taxation or prohibition.   
Other Property Issues 
  Several other issues key to nationbuilders’ understanding of property deserve 
brief treatment.  Each issue warrants volumes of discussion, but in the spirit of 
reductionism, the treatment here simply places the issue in the context of the exclusionary 
right. 
1.  Property and Resource Acquisition   
In strong-property nations, how resources are acquired determines whether or not 
the state recognizes them as property.  To be considered subject to the right of property 
resources cannot be acquired by coercion, theft, or fraud. 
82  The law recognizes a variety William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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of ways of legally acquiring resources in a property system, including exchange 
(contract), gift, accession, confusion, and first possession, but robbers, thieves, and 
defrauders do not own what they acquire and cannot take the resources of others without 
suffering the likelihood of criminal and civil consequences intended to protect lawfully 
recognized owners. 
83 
  Although the institution of a property system is of vital importance in 
nationbuilding, how resources are acquired in the first instance can be problematic during 
the creation of the system.  In some countries lacking effective property systems, a 
relatively few individuals or families have come to control much of the land and its 
resources.  What happens to these vast holdings as nations institute effective property 
systems is not certain.  Whether these holdings are formalized and protected by the 
property right or whether some type of redistributive land reform takes place before 
formalization occurs, economic disruption is likely to result. 
84  It is in the amelioration of 
this disruption that the international community can appropriately assist with various 
forms of aid, but always such assistance should be linked to the strengthening and 
stability of a broad-based property system if the goal is to maximize the future potential 
for resource development and production. 
  When governments rather than powerful families control the resources of a 
country, a property system can be instituted through sale of the resources, a lottery 
distribution, a free distribution to all citizens, or some type of claiming system such as 
homesteading.  In the United States, the surveying and distribution of public lands 
through sale helped hundreds of thousands of citizens to acquire millions of acres of land, 
85 which have remained within the property system ever since.  On the other hand, the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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Dawes Act, 
86 which failed to give Native Americans full property in certain reservation 
lands, thwarted existing tribal property systems, and created a federal trust on remaining 
lands that has seriously failed its purpose, 
87 hardly provides a model for implementing an 
effective property system. 
  One suggestion for nationbuilders attempting to place resource acquisition and 
development under a property system is to build the system from the bottom up rather 
than the top down.  In so doing, primary concern should be focused on ensuring that the 
vast majority of the people have their resources protected by property. 
88  As has been 
observed, one of the greatest virtues of an equally implemented exclusionary right is that 
it benefits the poor as much as the wealthy, 
89 who unlike the poor can protect their 
resources by force.  Building a property system from the bottom up also recognizes that 
freeing the poor from unnecessary regulatory shackles which may keep them from 
exercising the resource they acquire by original possession  the resource in themselves 
 is important to unleashing the incentive of property. 
  The studies of Hernando de Soto indicate that one way to formalize property in 
less-developed countries from the bottom up is to allow people to acquire land ownership 
through local consensus. 
90  Land is a basic building block in a private market economy, 
yet without a formal property recognition, one’s land cannot be resourcefully leveraged 
or capitalized since no lender is likely to extend credit secured by the land unless the 
borrower is an owner formally recognized by the state. 
91  De Soto recommends that local 
consensus works effectively in establishing the boundaries for formal property 
recognition. 
92  That local consensus exists suggests that in many parts of the world a de William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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facto property right is already present whose prosperity-creating incentive can then be 
unleashed through a state-recognized de jure right. 
2.  Property and the Equal Rights of Others   
Property is an exclusionary right that under the rule of law applies equally to the 
resource acquisitions and aggregations of the wealthy and the poor alike.  Property is like 
a blanket that covers everyone, allowing each person to acquire, create, and use resources 
in ways that produce the greatest potential for resource maximization.  However, property 
does permit some persons to accumulate resources that others do not have, and since by 
definition “resources” are what others may need or want, there is some justification for 
the familiar argument that if X has something in limited quantity that others need or want 
X has a type of power over them since she can bend them to her will so they can get what 
they need from her. 
93  Of course they have a similar “power” over her in a property 
system due to the resources they own, but since property permits unequal accumulations 
of resources, X may have greater “power” than they. They may need what she has more 
than she needs what they have.  Still, in the sense that property is a blanket, everyone 
enjoys an equal right to exclude, and thus Bill Gates has no more or less property than 
anyone else in the resources he owns. 
  Importantly, the equal exclusionary right that each person enjoys means that an 
owner’s use of resources has meaningful limits. 
94  Although Blackstone asserted that 
property was a right of “absolute dominion,” he also recognized that an owner’s “free 
use, enjoyment, and disposal” of resources was subject to “the laws of the land.” 
95  In 
Entick v. Carrington, Lord Chancellor Pratt wrote that the right of property “is preserved 
sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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by some public law for the good of the whole.” 
96  These statements may be taken to 
recognize the legitimacy of taxation of one’s resources, 
97 but they also acknowledge that 
one owner cannot use resources in certain ways so as to interfere with another owner’s 
use of resources. 
98  Property has no purpose outside of community, meaning that 
Robinson Crusoe had no need to worry about whether the fruit he picked or the animals 
he trapped belonged to someone else, and the implication of this is that the very 
definition of property contains a limit of resource use:  in a strong property system, one’s 
exclusionary right is always limited by the equal right of others to their resources. 
  Thus, property can be seen as the hub of Western legal systems and the law of 
contract and the law of tort as spokes radiating from the hub and establishing limitations 
protecting the equal property right of others.  Contract law sets forth equally enforceable 
conditions concerning consequences of the breach of an agreement to transfer  
resources. 
99  Tort law and much criminal law establish limits on what one can do with 
resources that are consonant with the equal limitations placed on others, and it provides 
various compensatory and punitive measures for one’s violation of these limitations. 
100  
Under this analysis, most all other areas of the law can also be reduced to spokes 
connected to the hub of property. 
101 
3. Property  Enforcement 
The concept of property also includes its adequate enforcement. 
102  Without the 
enforcement necessary to implement a property system, a nation will not be creating 
conditions conducive to maximum prosperity. 
103  In much of Western political theory the 
ultimate justification of the state is to legalize civilly and formally the right of property, 
104 but to stimulate the incentive that induces the greatest wealth of nations, the state must William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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also enforce contracts and ensure that corruption, fraud, theft, and coercion not make 
owners spend their efforts, ingenuity, time, and money defending valuable resources 
instead of freely using these resources to create, produce, and exchange new resources.  
Honest police, ethical lawyers, and impartial judges (or other dispute resolvers) are 
necessary to accomplish enforcement, and nationbuilders cannot claim to have 
implemented a strong property system without such enforcement. 
105 
  Prompt foreign assistance targeted at eliminating corruption and focusing on law 
enforcement might have prevented the economic debacle following the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union.  Rapid but incomplete market privatization coupled with scanty and 
ambiguous property law in the absence of adequate law enforcement materially caused 
the Russian economy to decline following the Soviet Union’s demise. 
106  On the other 
hand, in China the move from almost total state planning to partial property and contract 
recognition accompanied by the training of new judges and lawyers has provided the 
conditions for much new economic growth in that country. 
107 
Property and the Story of Evolved Human Behavior 
  The framers of the United States Constitution were largely Lockean in their view 
that “property” was something “natural” to human beings, 
108 which was associated with 
the belief that God had given people dominion over nature and over themselves.  This 
dominion is represented by the concept of “property,” which means in this usage as in  
other historical usages, the right to exclude others. 
109  Although the application of 
property to various resources has differed down through history, the view that property is 
a natural right, the protection for which civil government was established, continues to 
this very day and is often viewed as a moral right. 
110 Around the time of the American William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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Revolution, it was even called a “sacred” right, 
111 and the American colonies invoked its 
natural authority in contending that the British had no right to tax them without 
representation. 
112 
  Other thinkers and political theorists have argued that although property in no 
way has the imprimatur of divine providence, it is still the basis for the civil state, and its 
justification is the “common good.”  Thus, utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham termed 
property “the noblest triumph,” 
113 and both natural law and utilitarian theorists have 
recognized the incentive engendered by the exclusionary right as fostering social 
prosperity.  Whether “property” itself is a natural or purely civil institution, there seems 
to be something in its legal recognition that people respond to with greater resource 
production than when resources are state managed or communal. 
  Nationbuilders from other cultures may reject notions that the efficacy of a 
property system is based on God’s ordinance and may disagree with the ambiguous 
concept of the “common good.”  Why then does there seem to be such a profound 
relation between a right to exclude others from infringing on the results of our resourceful 
efforts and the greatest wealth of nations?  Economists argue that we act rationally in our 
“self interest,” 
114 but that is not an explanation of why the right of property engenders 
such resource production.  It is only a description of behavior. 
  An explanation, however, exists that, while controversial, fits much of an 
important new understanding of human behavior:  evolutionary psychology.  Although 
this explanation of evolved behavior is unnecessary to appreciating the fact that the 
exclusionary right in fact seems to engender the condition for maximum resource 
production, it does tell a story that helps illuminate what it means to say that we act out of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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self-interest, 
115 and it suggests why it is difficult to educate or otherwise persuade people 
voluntarily to share substantial resources according to the needs of strangers.  The story 
begins with the assertion that basic human behaviors are evolved characteristics, much 
like an upright posture or the possession of language capacity are evolved characteristics, 
and that these behaviors have been selected for because our ancestors who practiced them 
survived and passed on the genes which emphasized such successful behaviors in the first 
instance. 
116  Those who did not practice such behaviors are not our ancestors, i.e., they 
died out and did not pass on their genes. 
117 
  Although evolutionary psychology has difficulty relating evolved human behavior 
as an explanation for highly specific human actions, such as driving on the right (or left) 
side of the highway, the human concern with resource acquisition, the reluctance to 
surrender large portions of what one has acquired simply to meet the needs of strangers, 
and the initiative-dampening effect of coercing acquired resources from people (through 
taxation or otherwise) are very general, not specific, behavioral tendencies. 
118 They seem 
related to the fact that human children mature very slowly and require inordinate resource 
investment in contrast to the young of other species and that parental caregivers, as a part 
of the procreation of their genes, cannot afford to surrender too many limited resources to 
strangers that their offspring may need, else the offspring may not survive. 
119  Females 
as the primary caregivers tend to look carefully before mating for males who are both 
able and willing to help provide resources to raise offspring, 
120 whereas males tend to be 
assertive in acquiring and displaying resources in order to convince females of their 
mating worthiness. 
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  This story about human behavior is made more complex in that human resource 
behaviors evolved during the 98 or 99 percent of our existence as a species that was spent 
in small bands of hunter-gatherers whose “economies” resembled that of the lifeboat 
rather than the cornucopia. 
122 Members of these bands shared extensively with each 
other, 
123 but the bands were quite small and the members were considerably interrelated.  
In sharing with their relatives, they were literally perpetuating their own genes, 
124 held 
also by their relatives, and in any event they were avoiding conflict with people on whom 
they depended for cooperative enterprises like hunting and fighting.  They may have 
shared with the occasional stranger, but if they shared too many of their lifeboat 
resources with strangers, they had not enough for themselves and their offspring.  Those 
with the inclination for excessive sharing died out. 
  In contemporary society, the behaviors evolved for small hunter-gatherer bands 
still prevail in modern humans. 
125 The concern about acquiring more resources, the 
attractiveness for mating of those who have large resource holdings, and the reluctance to 
share a very significant portion of personal resources with strangers are all still deeply 
embedded in human behavior. 
126 Perhaps, most importantly, foreknowledge of the 
coerced taking of the resources one produces still depresses human initiative to maximize 
resourceful effort since the resources so produced are not perceived to benefit the 
individual nor her family or relatives. 
127  We do not appreciate consciously how deeply 
inclined we are toward these self-interested (and offspring-interested) behaviors, but 
inclined we are.  
  The point of this story is that “property” is the legal institution that accommodates 
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maximum incentive to resourceful productions because this right allows us to exclude 
others from what we acquire so we can direct it toward our own survival and the survival 
of our offspring and relatives. Since people in strong property nations live not in lifeboat 
economies but in cornucopia economies that allow them to produce far more than they or 
their families can consume, they specialize and trade for mutual advantage in the market.  
As the supplies of resources increase, competition arises, and the prices of resources 
decrease.  People can acquire more while spending less, and prosperity flowers. 
128 
  The story of evolved resource behavior contains no moral justification for 
selfishness, legal recognition of gender differences, or oppression of strangers or the 
poor.  It merely emphasizes that to educate, cajole, and coerce people to produce 
according to their abilities and to share according to the needs of strangers does not create 
the potential for resource-maximizing economies.  Nationbuilders may preach sharing 
and study creative ways of taxing cornucopia resources so as to minimize the perception 
of resource coercion, but they must also enforce a strong property system that 
accommodates rather intractable human behavior in order to grow the greatest wealth of 
nations.  Thus, the case for property “is borne of human nature, not seventeenth century 
philosophy.” 
129 
LIBERTY 
  One commentator worries that the West has forgotten the connection between 
property and prosperity. 
130  Numerous recent references urging nationbuilders to frame 
their economies with a strong property system suggest that the memory was not forgotten 
but merely repressed and that once again it is emerging into consciousness. 
131  On the 
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in the spirit of reductionism, this memory, too, needs refreshing.  Nationbuilders should 
want to know of the similarity of these concepts in history so they can help construct free 
as well as prosperous societies.   
  Although the Greeks and other ancients may have enjoyed considerable freedoms, 
they lacked the grasp of a term equivalent to “liberty.” 
132  In Western history one of its 
earlier accounts of liberty appears in the enumerations of the Charter of Liberties, better 
known as the Magna Carta or Great Charter. 
133  Central to the Charter of Liberties and 
the next 800 years of constitutional liberty in England and its colonies is the 1215 version 
of due process:  “No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of his 
freehold, or in any way molested; and we [the King, the State] will not set forth against 
him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers.” 
134 Note that the 
liberty an owner has from being arbitrarily deprived of a right to land (freehold) is given 
equal significance with the liberty not to be arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned. 
  By 1225, the Charter of Liberties had added to its enumerations a provision that 
foreshadows modern protections against uncompensated takings:  “No Sheriff or Baliff of 
ours, or any other, shall take the horses or carts of any man to make carriage, except he 
pay the old price limited, that is to say, for carriage with two horse x.d. a day; for three 
horse xiv.d. a day.” 
135  To secure the citizenry against arbitrary state takings by requiring 
compensation deserves the name “liberty” just as to free people to use their resources by 
allowing them legally to exclude others from interfering with those resources warrants 
the name “property.”  Both terms express the right of exclusion against the state, and 
although liberty today generally refers to the right of private persons to exclude the state 
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property is usually used in reference to exclusive non-facultative resources, the two are 
virtual synonyms in their exclusionary connotation.  Further, if the resources of the self, 
including speech, movement, and free direction of effort, are considered the basis of non-
facultative resource creation, then the liberty right to direct the resources of self and the 
property right to direct non-facultative resources become inextricably related.  What must 
be remembered is that outside of the economic lifeboat (where the main issue is resource 
division) people generate additional, prosperity-engendering resources through their 
efforts, and although raw materials are important to resource generation, they do not by 
themselves often represent consumable resources.  They become consumable or useful 
resources only after the application of human faculties, the liberty and property of which 
give greatest incentive to resourceful production. 
  That liberty and property are interconnected is suggested not only by the Charter 
of Liberties but also throughout English constitutionalism.  Five-hundred years after the 
Charter of Liberties, Blackstone in his famous Commentaries on the common law 
identified three “absolute” rights “inherent in every Englishman.” 
136  They were (1) 
“personal security,” or “a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his 
limbs, his body, his health and his reputation,” 
137 (2) “personal liberty,” or “the power of 
loco-motion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s 
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,” 
138 and  (3) property. 
139  The 
resemblance of these rights to the familiar triune “life, liberty, and property” is a strong 
one, but Blackstone adds that these rights “are usually summed up in one general 
application and denominated the natural liberty of mankind.” 
140 That property is a subset 
of natural liberty is unmistakably asserted. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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  Not long after Blackstone wrote, James Madison turned around this assertion and 
maintained that liberty is a form of property.  Acknowledging that in its “particular 
application,” property refers the dominion that one “claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual,” 
141 Madison also 
argued that “[i]n its larger and juster meaning” property includes one’s “opinions and the 
free communication of them,” the “profession and practice” of one’s religion, the “free 
use” of one’s “faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them,” and 
“the safety and liberty” of one’s person. 
142 Defining property as Madison does as a right 
“in exclusion of every other individual” 
143 leaves little semantic difference between 
property and liberty. 
  Legal historian John Phillip Reid has made the broad claim that “[t]here may have 
been no eighteenth-century educated American who did not associate defense of liberty 
with defense of property.” 
144  Again, Professor Reid:  “Today we think of their emphasis 
upon property as a defense of the material and tend to forget how much the concept of 
liberty in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries depended upon property . . . . [I]t is 
sometimes forgotten that liberty itself was spoken of and thought of as a property.” 
145 As 
a colonial American wrote in 1768:  “Liberty and Property are not only join’d in common 
discourse, but are in their own natures so nearly ally’d, that we cannot be said to possess 
the one without the other.” 
146  Securing “the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity” 
147 was, after all, primarily about ensuring that the state would not be able to 
take without consent or compensation what belonged to the citizens, including their 
facultative freedoms, and along with Madison, they believed that even as one “is said to 
have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”
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Both the genesis of the American Revolution and of the Constitution lie in that which is 
similar in both liberty and property. 
  Conceptually, the near indistinguishability of the rights of liberty and property is 
found in the works of John Locke, and repeatedly in his Second Treatise on Government, 
which may have had greater philosophical impact on the American Revolution than any 
other political work, 
149 Locke asserts that one has a property in the facultative rights to 
oneself. 
150 This concept of self ownership equates property and liberty, for both terms 
refer to one’s right to exclude the state and others from facultative and non-facultative 
resources alike. 
  Currently, it may be fashionable to separate the concepts of liberty and property, 
but the entire legal basis for colonial America’s argument against the British state was 
that the most basic exclusionary principle of English constitutionalism and common law 
 that of liberty/property  was being taken from the colonists by taxation without due 
process representation. 
151  The Lord Mayor of London acknowledged that “if we can tax 
the Americans without their consent [i.e., their representation in Parliament], they have 
no property, nothing they can call their own,” 
152 and this deprivation was the taking of 
liberty itself.  For nationbuilders who wish to grasp what about the underpinnings of 
prosperity and freedom in the United States is most essential, the key is to appreciate the 
interconnected meaning of liberty and property as the general right to exclude the state 
and others from the broadest range of resources, with self ownership as the generative 
basis for maximum production of new and additional resources. 
  That not everyone was free to enjoy the right of exclusion is not an indictment of 
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century Great Britain.  That women had no right to vote and had a limited property right 
and that Africans were enslaved in the New World and had the self-ownership right 
enjoyed by others stripped from them does not contradict the premise that the 
exclusionary right is the hallmark both of freedom and prosperity.  However, it does 
show the horrendous consequences of failing to extend liberty and property to all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the state, and it illustrates that the ideals of liberty and property 
fall short of perfect accomplishment in even the freest and most prosperous nations.   
  The lesson for nationbuilders is that it is not enough to proclaim the words 
“liberty” and “property” but that the exclusionary right underlying these terms must be 
equally and generally applied under the rule of law and that the resources to which it 
applies must be specified in the widest terms.  Moreover, the more resources to which 
liberty/property applies, the stronger the system and the freer and more prosperous the 
citizenry.  The caveat is always that the price of such a system is eternal vigilance and 
that although it may be easy to say the words “liberty” and “property,” it can be difficult 
to enforce them in practice with regard to the equal exclusionary right of others. 
153 
  The final section considers how those who run giant businesses can ignore the 
equal exclusionary right of others.  The issues of corporate governance are pressing, and 
they illustrate well the difficulties of implementing the enforcement of a strong system of 
liberty/property (hereinafter, “property”) in order to create freedom, prosperity, and 
peace. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
  Specifically, corporate governance refers to the legal relationship among the  
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it. 
154  In a broader sense, corporate governance relates to the general limits that society 
places (or should place) on economic actors, the very biggest of which are transnational 
corporations.  Whether in its specific or broad sense, the issues of corporate governance 
can be reduced to the exclusionary right  the property right  as it is limited by the 
equal right of others.  The operation of a strong property system does not free economic 
actors to do anything they wish but rather it protects the resources of the weaker against 
the predations of the more powerful.  It secures the equal right of all. 
The Specific Sense of Corporate Governance and Property 
  Some of the very worst abuses of corporate governance in the specific sense can 
today be found in Russia where “strong man” domination of the formerly communist 
manufacturing sector of the economy prevails.  Former Soviet managers often continue to 
control companies without any nod to their new outside owners; accounting procedures 
are weak and firm decisionmaking lacks minimal transparency; and extremely low 
market values of company stocks reflect investor conviction that corruption, 
mismanagement, fraud, and theft are the norm. 
155  Merrit Fox and Michael Heller assert 
that many Russian managers “refuse to register share purchases by outsiders, refuse to 
recognize board directors properly elected by outside shareholders, dilute stock in ways 
that freeze out outsiders by issuing shares to insiders for inadequate consideration, or 
engage in false bankruptcies that wipe out shareholders’ interests.” 
156  One manager 
installed guards to keep shareholders out of a gypsum plant and ignored dozens of court 
decisions against him over several years. 
157 
  This list of corporate governance horrors can be reduced to the egregious failure 
to institute, implement, and enforce a strong property system.  For a private market to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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function, the state must enable business owners to exclude others from interfering with 
business resources, and “others” certainly include the fiduciary agents (company 
managers) employed by the owners.  In part, the sad lack of corporate governance in 
Russia is attributable to IMF economists who encouraged Russia in the months following 
the Soviet Union’s collapse toward market fundamentalism, 
158 the belief that 
privatization itself can alleviate the inadequacies of state planning and set a developing 
country on the road to economic growth. A more measured, bottom-up approach like that 
China is taking, which allows the development of smaller private companies within a 
growing commercial law framework, 
159 would have worked better for Russia.  However, 
by 1997, when Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan described “the rule of law,” 
“property,” “contract,” and “judicial review and determination” as “the essential 
infrastructure of a market economy,” 
160 it was too late for Russia.  The average per 
capita income had declined dramatically below even Soviet days. 
161 
  To inculcate the values of fiduciary obligation into business managers requires 
not only that corporate governance laws exist but that education and social culture 
support the right of property.  When American settlers traveled the Overland Trail 
westward, and were often beyond the law’s enforcement by any jurisdiction, the respect 
for the property right was still such that “the concept of private property remained largely 
inviolable, even when conditions were trying and people desperate.” 
162  In circumstances 
of dire need, travelers continued to contract for others’ resources, rather than stealing 
them, 
163 and there were virtually no recorded instances of forceful taking of what one 
had that another wanted or needed. 
164 However, in the new century, when some do not 
recognize the rule of law and legal systems as foundational to the study of business, 
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the problems of corporate governance in the United States is on the rise.  Scandals at 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, ImClone, Quest, and Global Crossing all represent 
corruption and fraud in business managers’ acquiring the resources of their companies’ 
investor-owners, corporate-governance failures that reflect not only weak laws 
guaranteeing the equal rights of others but also the absence of the values that respected 
the right to exclude on the Overland Trail.  Adequate corporate governance requires both 
laws that secure the property right of business owners against their managerial agents and 
the social commitment to the values of property that is ideally supported by an educated 
understanding of the property system. 
166 
  The intent of this essay is not to articulate the rules necessary for adequate 
corporate governance, which in any event may vary from culture to culture, but to place 
corporate governance within the property right of exclusion, which the essay argues is 
necessary to attain the maximum potential for resource development.  As the next section 
contends, the broader sense of corporate governance as regulating the relationship 
between economic actors, especially the more substantial ones, and society also is 
contained within the appreciation of a property system. 
The Broad Sense of Corporate Governance and Property 
  A whole host of groups comprise the anti-globalization movement that 
demonstrates at the meetings of the World Trade Organization.  Environmental groups, 
labor unions, and various groups concerned about the environment and the health, safety, 
and wages of workers in less developed nations make up the bulk of demonstrators, 
167 
and their concerns can be met through adequate implementation of a single concept:  
property.  Further, since the issues that concern the anti-globalization movement are William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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generally those that involve the potentially adverse affects that large businesses may have 
on the resources of those who live in lesser-developed countries, the broad sense of 
corporate governance is implicated.  The following two sections reduce these corporate 
governance issues to a debate over property, and who should be able to exclude whom 
from what.  The discussion will not resolve the debate but rather focus it.   
1.    The Right to Pollute as an Object of Property 
 Environmentalists  (and  some  labor unionists) fear that businesses are leaving the 
United States and other Western nations who have relatively comprehensive 
environmental protection laws and moving to less developed countries who have little or 
no environmental protection. 
168  What they do not usually grasp is that the issues raised 
in such moves are better framed not only by appeals to vanishing rainforests and 
atmospheric warming but also by assertions of corporate governance failure and the need 
for strong property systems.  When companies flee environmental protection laws and 
seek out countries with inadequate environmental regulation, they threaten resources like 
the air and water that are common to all and thus they violate the equal right of all to use 
these resources.  This right can be conceptually reduced to a property right, and the 
implementation of an equal right to exclude is central to a strong property system. 
  Admittedly, even in the West, it is not usual to think of private persons as owning 
the air and water, but broadly speaking, they do insomuch as they can legally exclude 
others from certain interferences with these resources, and they have a right to enjoin or 
seek remedy against those who injure these resources.  Just as private co-owners of land 
(tenants in common) can sue other co-owners who injure (lay waste) to the common 
resource, 
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that each has to unpolluted air and water, an exercise of property takes place.  That what 
constitutes an infringement on one’s ownership of air and water has to be defined by law 
 and since courts will usually lack the expertise to set such environmental standards, 
they will need setting by public legislative or administrative action  is not significant.  
Courts can and already do interpret and apply such standards when disputes arise. 
  In the United States, any citizen whose interest is directly affected can sue to 
enforce Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act standards. 
170  This standing to sue is a 
recognition of property in the sense asserted here because it is the right to exclude others 
from interfering with one’s resource.  That many of the other traditional incidents of 
ownership are not associated with the property indicated by the Clean Air Act and the 
Clean Water Act may concern common law legal scholars, but the right of exclusion is 
the sine qua non of property, and environmental laws do allow for citizens to exclude 
companies or others from injuring the air and water, as measured by the rules set by the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  Environmentalists demonstrating at the World Bank 
meeting, and nationbuilders in developing countries, should realize that both the 
maintenance of clean air and water as well as of long-term sustainable prosperity 
involving their use are managed most productively by formalizing as much of the world’s 
resources as possible into an exclusionary property system. 
171 
  Consider what might happen if the right to pollute the world’s air and water 
resources were truly brought within the property system.  For instance, if everyone on 
earth legally owned proportionate shares to pollute the world’s air and water, 
172 these 
shares could be sold to those who need to pollute according to safe standards for total 
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atmospheric pollutant is the level considered safe to emit on an annual basis, then each 
person in the world could have a property in ten pounds of this pollutant.  To reduce 
transaction costs, individuals might not have to trade their individual shares, rather the 
appropriate international agency (United Nations?) could auction off periodically these 
rights to polluters, and the proceeds could be distributed to the countries of the world on a 
population-proportionate basis.  One approach could be to agree by international treaty to 
specify the use of such funds for national investment purposes like education, health, 
disaster relief, and infrastructure.  Eventually and ideally, each individual might 
personally receive her share from the pollution auction, or get a tax credit.  The point is 
not that such a property creation is likely in the current economic and political climate 
but that environmental corporate governance concerns can be reduced for debate to issues 
of property, which, as has been previously asserted, is the central hub of Western legal 
systems. 
173 
2.   Worker Health, Safety, and Non-Discrimination as Objects of Property 
  The most economically basic resource that people have is the one that they have 
in themselves, i.e., their potential for effort and ingenuity, supported by their physical 
integrity, a resource historically protected by the right to exclude others. 
174 When 
workers have their health impaired because of poor working conditions or their personal 
safety abridged by employment-related injury, the property in their most essential 
resource is infringed.  In property-strong countries, health and safety statutes and systems 
of tort and worker’s compensation help secure the resources that workers own in 
themselves, but in property-weak nations unhealthful and dangerous working conditions 
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governance laws that limit uninhibited business activity around the globe seem 
appropriate on both health and safety grounds and are fully consonant with the regime of 
property.  
  Companies may respond that even as a property system allows them to take risks 
with their resources, it also holds them to losses when poor choices are made and that the 
same risks and losses are inherent in employment.  As long as employers and employees 
risk their resources voluntarily, the state should not skew the voluntary exchange of 
resources, which produces the greatest social prosperity.  Although efficiency is indeed 
defined by the voluntary exchange of resources in a strong property system, market 
imperfections such as transaction costs that defeat compensation when an employer has 
caused injury to an employee (e.g., the lack of a tort system) and asymmetries of 
information between contracting parties in the employment context (e.g., workers not 
understanding health and safety risks) 
175 make market fundamentalism a less compelling 
social option than adequate corporate governance in all countries of the world. In poor, 
property-weak countries the absence of an adequate tort system and/or safety and health 
statutes and the lack of established contract law with doctrines of duress, incapacity, 
undue influence, mistake, and unconscionability weaken the merits of the voluntary-
exchange argument when balanced against the need to strengthen the equal right of others 
through broad corporate governance.  
  Whether domestically or internationally instituted, corporate governance to 
prohibit invidious discrimination against qualified workers due to race, gender, age, and 
other inherent characteristics can also be couched in property-related terms.  The main 
issue is where does the state assign the right of property. 
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property of the employer to exclude others from interfering with the employer’s free use 
of resources in the choice to hire and fire on any basis, including various discriminations 
based on inherent racial or other characteristics, or does it acknowledge the property right 
of the employee and job applicant to exclude the employer from discriminating based on 
such characteristics, effectively recognizing certain non-discrimination as an individual 
resource.  In analyzing these questions in the context of property, recall that property is a 
right of exclusion, not tangible or intangible things, and that the state should assign, or 
not assign, the exclusionary right to a resource according to whether it wishes to produce 
more or less of the resource.  Recognizing an exclusionary right of discrimination in the 
employer gives incentive to discriminate and in all reasonable likelihood will lead to 
greater discrimination from employers who desire to discriminate than when the job-
applicant or employee can legally exclude the employer from discriminating, in which 
case more non-discrimination will probably be generated. 
177  
  Although it is not usual to think of discrimination and non-discrimination as 
objects of the property right, neither was it common at one time to consider the copying 
of literary and musical works or the protection of inventions, trade secrets, and business 
goodwill as the objects of property. 
178  In terms of corporate governance, however, the 
reduction of the relationship of business managers to business owners and the 
relationship of business enterprises both to employees and society generally as 
concerning where the exclusionary property right lies is illuminating.  Some managers 
will likely always misappropriate the resources of corporate owners, and globalization 
and anti-globalization forces may never entirely come to agreement, but in order to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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understand the maximum potential for prosperity, the term that frames the debate should 
be “property,” the right to exclude others from limited resources. 
CONCLUSION 
  Property is not found in the informal tenets of Western culture nor does it derive 
from the genes of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, although it may be an expression of 
both.  Rather, it is a formal, constitutive principle of political, legal, and economic life 
that seems to accommodate the resource-oriented behaviors of nations of strangers in a 
way that encourages people to become more prosperous and to feel freer than either the 
state- planning system of socialist coercion or the market fundamentalism of economic 
laissez-faire theory.  At its heart property is the legally-instituted right to exclude others, 
including the state (but with the support of the state) from resources that are originally 
owned (one’s faculties), or are acquired without force, fraud, or theft. 
  Since property is a way of ordering resources in community, the individual’s 
exclusionary right in a strong system is always limited by the equal exclusionary right of 
others.  This limitation is the same one that limits liberty, for property and liberty are 
merely two sides of the same coin; it is a limitation which emphasizes that an adequate 
property system in its very meaning does not allow the few to use their resources to abuse 
the many.  And although property/liberty may answer the question of how to produce a 
prosperous, free community, it does not address how society should morally respond to 
the individually poor, infirm, and unfortunate among us.  An appreciation, however, of 
the natural incentives to production that the institution of property maximally encourages 
does tell us that if the state excessively coerces resources from those who have to meet 
the needs or wants of others who lack (or the state cannot effectively prevent private William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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persons from coercing the resources of others), both prosperity and freedom are 
weakened. 
  As a formal legal institution rather than a moral imperative, property does not 
specify the scope of resources to which it should (or should not) apply.  The right to 
exclude is merely a neutral principle that powers resource increase by protecting the 
expression of natural tendencies of resource creation, acquisition, and display connected 
to mating and child care, connected so that to deprive persons of the increase from these 
tendencies can significantly depress incentive to resourceful activity in ways that neither 
education nor coercion can effectively overcome in a society.  All societies apply private 
exclusion to at least some resources, but the issues of which resources property should 
protect and how deeply to tax private resources to provide a common infrastructure and 
to assist those in exigent need without killing the goose that lays the golden wealth of 
nations still remains unresolved.  That the legal institution of a strong, well-enforced 
property system, however, supports both freedom in the facultative resources of the 
person and national abundance from the marketplace exchanges of non-facultative 
resources seems significantly settled.  For nationbuilders concerned with a prosperity and 
liberty that nurture the hope for sustainable peace, this reductionism is the beginning.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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Lord Chief Justice and Chancellor under Henry VI asserting that because in England “every inhabitant is at 
his liberty fully to use and enjoy whatever his farm produceth,” including the improvements “of those he 
retains in his service …: hence it is, that the inhabitants are rich in gold, silver, and in all the necessaries 
and conveniences of life”); ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS 2 (1897) (stating that the property right 
“is the chief modern motive to labor, to care, and to avoidance of waste and destruction”); RICHARD 
SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY, THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 242 (1951) (quoting David Hume that 
“whatever is produced or improved by a man’s art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order 
to give encouragement to such useful habits and accomplishments); SCHLATTER , id at 246 (quoting Jeremy 
Bentham “that in order to incite men to work the law ought to secure to each man the results of his 
industry.”); Adam Smith, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 592 (Edwin Canan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776): 
    That security which the laws in Great Britain give to every 
    man that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour is alone 
    sufficient to make any country flourish …. The natural effort 
    of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered 
    to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a 
    principle that it is alone, and without any assistance … capable  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
  44
                                                                                                                                                 
    of carrying on society to wealth and prosperity …. 
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contract rights) as property.  This difficulty, which relates to the fact that property does not really apply to a 
resource until the court or legislature specifies that it does in spite of the judicial propensity to “discover” 
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institute property in body parts) with Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
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(defining property as being “in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”). 
61 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring) 
(asserting that “[p] roperty depends upon exclusion by law from interference … “).  See also id at 250 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[a] n essential element of individual property is the legal right to 
exclude others from enjoying it”). 
62 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 297 (C.B. Macpherson ed., reprinted Penguin Classics 1985) (1651) 
(stating that “[t] he Propriety [property] which a subject hath in his hands, consisteth in a right to exclude 
all other subjects from the use of them”). 
63 Important to the understanding of nationbuilders is that even though in contemporary times the state may 
tax land to support public education, or that even though in feudal times land ownership had certain duties William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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of military service and support attached to it, “property” has not changed its essential meaning as the right 
to exclude.  However, as the state increases taxation on a resource or levies heavier duties against it, the 
property right weakens in regard to that resource (or the resource shrinks), and at some point the incentive 
to initiate further resource development is also weakened. 
64 Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude,  supra note 53, at 730.  Cf. A. JAMES CASNER, et al, CASES 
AND TEXTS ON PROPERTY 4 (4
TH edition, 2000) (stating that  
“[w] herever and whenever property rights have arisen, one of their central features is a right to exclude 
others”).  A short explanation is warranted here concerning how the exclusionary right applies to property’s 
familiar division into “private,” “public,” and “common” usages.  Private property is the exclusionary right 
persons have in their resources; it represents the dominant usage of “property” and provides the primary 
connotation that nationbuilders need to grasp.  Public property is the exclusionary right that the state 
exercises over resources, and the state certainly excludes private citizens from many uses of the resources it 
holds.  “Common property” as it refers to resources like the atmosphere or oceans is largely a misnomer 
due to the fact that one cannot usually exclude others from using these resources; more accurately, the 
reference is to common “resources,” thus avoiding the confusion of property with resources.  However, as 
suggested, infra, notes 169-73 and accompanying text, if the state were to recognize everyone’s right to 
exclude others from polluting common resources, it would be appropriate to term this right as “property,” 
even as co-owners of land have the right to exclude each other from wasting its resources. 
65 Trespass is the “fertile mother of actions.”  F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 
48 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1963) (1909). It is the basis of modern tort law.  William J. 
Bowman & Patrick F. Hofer, The Fallacy of Personal Injury Liability Coverage for Environmental Claims, 
12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 393, 411 (1993) (explaining that “to examine the history of trespass is to explore the 
history of all torts, for it evolved into the forms of redress for all civil wrongs.…Trespass to land was but 
one of these wrongs.”).  Trespass recognizes a sphere of private resources related not only to land and other 
non-facultative resources but also to the faculties and body of an owner who can exclude others from 
interfering with (trespassing on) this sphere. 
66 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 8 
(1933) (stating that “[p] rivate enterprise, which has molded economic life since the close of the middle 
ages, has been rooted in the institution of private property”); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST, THE SOCIAL 
VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (describing property as an “indispensable” institution “for 
creating a modern market-oriented economic system”); Alan Greenspan, infra note 160 and accompanying 
text (describing property as an “essential infrastructure of a market economy”).  See generally, Reed, supra 
note 4. 
67 In other words, “without the right institutional environment [i.e., property and contract], a country will be 
restricted to trades that are self enforcing.”  MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY 185 (2000). 
68 Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCE 
11, 17 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997). 
69 Id. 
70 This includes the power of the state, which is always greater than the power of the individual. 
71 Reed, supra note 4, at 451-52 (discussing how property creates security for capital borrowing and 
investment, provides incentive to improve resources, and identifies and protects resources than can be used 
then for further resource development).  See generally, DE SOTO, supra note 35. 
72 Making Sustainable Development Work, FDCH Fed. Dept. & Agency Docs., July 12, 2002,  available in 
LEXIS, News Group File (quoted by Sec. of State Colin Powell). 
73 The converse is also true:  countries with no formal property systems are the poorest in the world.  The 
empirical studies that justify these statements are found infra,  
notes 74-78. 
74 GERALD P. O’DRISCOLL, JR., et al., 2002 INDEX OF ECONOMIC  FREEDOM 37 (2002) 
75 Id. at 40. 
76 Id. at 40. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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77 JAMES GWARTNEY, et al., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD:  1975-1995 (1996). 
78 Gerald W. Sully, The Institutional Framework and Economic Development, 96 J. POL. ECON. 952 (1989). 
79 The quoted phrase is the subtitle to DE SOTO, supra note 35. 
80 DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 177 (asserting that the “importance of property rights has been emphasized 
by various economic historians who believe that the boom in technological innovation in the West, and the 
massive investment that made it possible, began only at the end of the eighteenth century, when property 
rights were perfected and made independent of politics”).  Thus, for at least two hundred years, property 
has been “the most important legal conception” in Western culture.  TONY HONORE, MAKING LAW BIND 
161 (1987).  Yet unfortunately “today, few are aware of the tremendous edge that formal property systems 
have given Western societies.”  DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 224-25. 
81 The figures cited supra, notes 74-75 and accompanying text are the basis for this approximate figure.  
The per capita income differences between the very wealthiest, strong-property nations and the very 
poorest, weak-property nations can vary from 10 to 100 fold.  Cf. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, 
supra note 11. 
82 Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 370 (Donald Winch ed., Penguin Classics 
1988) (1848) (“According to the fundamental idea of property, indeed, nothing ought to be treated as such, 
which has been acquired by force or fraud, or appropriation in ignorance of a prior title vested in some 
other person ….”).  That one cannot acquire resources “dishonestly” and then have them protected by the 
property right is part of ensuring this right in others.  Compare MARKBY, supra note 56.  (“It [that one is 
‘the absolute and exclusive owner’] does not mean that he may exercise his ownership in accordance with 
his uncontrolled fancy.…I cannot exercise my rights in such a way to infringe the law or the rights of 
others.”). 
83 Since property organizes social order in relation to the distribution and production of resources, it 
necessarily is sensitive to the community’s interest that one not become an owner through coercion, theft, 
or fraud and thus violate the equal property right of others.  Criminal and tort law are spokes radiating from 
the central conceptual hub of property in Western legal systems, spokes that generally serve to enforce the 
equal property right of others or else compensate for its infringement. 
84 Note that the initial assignment of the property right to X or Y is not dictated by some inevitable 
arrangement, and the argument can be made that vast resource holdings acquired outside of a formal 
property system are not protected from redistribution, but once the assignment is recognized within a 
formal property system that protects the equal exclusionary right of all persons, reassignment will be 
strongly resisted and if it occurs may produce substantial weakening of incentive because of the uncertainty 
felt concerning the further reallocation of resources.  Facing uncertainty about where the right of property 
lies — or is likely to lie in the future — people will tend to keep their assets concealable and easily 
movable.  They will also be unlikely to risk them in fixed locations in ways productive of resource growth. 
85 The basic act was the Homestead Act.  43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (enacted) (partially repealed by the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2744, 2787). 
86 General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 25 U.S.C. § 331-358 (2002) (331-333 
repealed). 
87 See generally Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment:  Indian Property and the Myth of Common 
Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001). 
88 In other words, the state should focus on the broad enforcement of the property right, such that common 
citizens feel secure in their persons and possessions and have recourse for resource infringement and injury.  
However, when the focus is on privatizing large industrial and mining enterprises, getting ownership 
adequately into the hands of outsiders who can prevent insider corruption and looting can be difficult.  See, 
generally, ROMAN FRYDMAN AND ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE:  IS THE 
STATE WITHERING AWAY ? (1994) (chronicling the experiences of a Polish economist and lawyer in 
helping privitize state enterprises through a voucher system).  On Russia’s attempts to privatize industry, 
which has led to a corporate governance crisis in ownership, see FOX & HELLER, infra note 155. 
89 E.g., TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH:  PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES 202 
(1998) (observing that “if property laws are applied equally they will work above all to the advantage of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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poor”).  Thus, the United States may still have poor individuals, but it hardly has the level of poverty that 
exists in most areas of the world. 
90 Local consensus does not mean informal ownership; rather, it refers to how formal ownership protected 
by the state should be determined, namely, by local agreement that is then recognized by the state.  It is a 
way of “adapting the law to the social and economic needs of the majority of the population.”  DE SOTO, 
supra note 35, at 106.  In this way law is “made to serve popular capital formation and economic growth.”  
Id.  Another example of a bottom-up, property-based approach to economic development involves the 
micro-lending activities of the Grameen Bank, which provides unsecured business loans to the poor in the 
developing world.  See MUHAMEED YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR, MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE 
AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (1999). 
91 DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 60 (“Without the tools of formal property, it is hard to see how assets could 
be used for everything they accomplish in the West.  How else could financial organizations identify 
trustworthy borrowers on a massive scale?”). 
92 De Soto is referring to property determination by local consensus when he describes informal resource 
boundaries as marked by barking dogs. DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 162 (“Any government that is serious 
about reengineering the ruling informal agreements into one national formal property social contract needs 
to listen to its barking dogs.  To integrate all forms of property into a unified system, governments must 
find out how and why local conventions work and how strong they actually are.”).  Id at 168 (“What 
governments in developing countries have to do is listen to the barking dogs in their own communities and 
find out what their law should say.”). 
93 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 260 
(1990) (asserting that “the myth of property is pernicious because it hides a structure of power and insulates 
it from democratic debate”); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) 
(stating that if “somebody else wants to use the food, the house, the land, or the plow which the law calls 
mine, he has to get my consent.  To the extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the 
law thus confers on me a power limited but real to make him do what I want”); Kenneth R. Minogue, The 
Concept of Property and Its Contemporary Significance, in NOMOS XXII:  PROPERTY 3, 5 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (stating that “ownership of Wildfell Hall [Blackacre], it often 
seems, is a form of power that allows us to exploit other people”). 
The focus on property as power has a strong Marxian flavor.  Sheldon S. Wolin, On Reading Marx 
Politically, in MARXISM:  NOMOS XXVI 79, 89 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983) 
(noting the “persistence with which he [Marx] judged each theory according to the standard of power”). 
Ultimately, power is not an analytically useful concept in contrasting property versus redistributionist 
resource systems.  In any society whoever controls vast resources has “power” in the sense of the citations 
of note 93, and this especially includes the state, which has power over both those from whom it takes 
resources and those to whom resources are redistributed and who must obey the state in order to obtain 
further resources.  In fact, in a strong property society there will be more needed resources available 
privately to everybody than in a redistributionist society, and this in a real sense reduces the power that the 
state is capable of exercising over one.  Since people on average tend to be much more prosperous in a 
strong property society that has many sources for inexpensive resources available, private individuals also 
generally do not have undue power over others on account of unequal resources.   99.9 percent of the 
population in the United States can say “fie on you Bill Gates” without concern that the world’s richest 
man can exercise any power at all over them. 
94 Further, these limits are part of the definition of property.  If the rich can use their resources to injure or 
coerce the resources of the poor, it indicates a weak property system, usually one lacking an adequate 
enforcement of the property right.  E.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogues on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 357, 362 (1954) (stating that “if any property owner could really do anything he pleases with his own 
property, the rights of all of his neighbors would be undermined.… In fact private property as we know it is 
always subject to limitations based on the rights of other individuals in the universe.”). 
95 II BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 60, at 138. 
96 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howells St. Trials 1029, 1066 (1765). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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97 Taxation is necessary even under the strongest of property systems for public goods like roads and 
military defenses that resource exchanges among individuals do not generate well because of excessive 
transaction costs, “free riders,” and “last-holder” problems.  Adequate humanitarian assistance also requires 
taxation. 
98 It is vital to emphasize to nationbuilders that perhaps the most important and least recognized features of 
a strong property system is that it respects the equal property rights of others.  Without such respect, 
engendered by the state through impartial, timely enforcement of the exclusive rights of all citizens, 
property cannot create the kind of prosperity and liberty that exist in Western nations. 
99 Without contract the promise to transfer resources in the future would be meaningless, and Professor 
Nichols identifies the recognition of contract law as the most salient characteristic of an economy that is 
ready for international trade.  Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 229 (1999).  Underlying contract, however, must be the fact that the contracting parties have the legal 
right to exclude others from the resources which are the object of the contract.  That legal right is property. 
100 Note that to achieve desirable reductionism, no distinction is made here between legal wrongs to one’s 
person and legal wrongs to one’s land or widgets, nor to civil or criminal responses to these wrongs.  In all 
instances one has the right to exclude others from interfering with one’s resources broadly defined; i.e., one 
has property. 
101 Nationbuilders should keep in mind that the issue is always who can exclude whom, from what, and 
when. 
102 Thus, “there is a consensus that property cannot exist without some institutional structure that stands 
ready to support it.”  Merrill, supra note 53, at 733.  Blackstone agrees.  II BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, 
supra note 60, at 141 (“Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and 
property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered 
therein.”). 
103 The concept of “maximum prosperity” can be extended to include not only the generation of resources 
that are typically generated in the marketplace but also the maximum encouragement of the facultative 
resources of the self, the condition traditionally associated with “liberty.” 
104 For example, in the American experience consider James Madison’s assertion about the broad sense of 
property:  “Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various 
rights of individuals as that which the term particularly expresses.”  MADISON, supra note 3, at 102. 
Compare the views of Gouverneur Morris:  “It was only for the sake of property that men gave up the 
greater freedom of the state of nature and submitted themselves to the constraints of society and 
government.”  Quoted in NEDELSKY, supra note 93, at 68.  Nor should these views be considered held only 
by Locke and his adherents, but rather, in Samuel Adams’ words, property is “an essential, unalterable right 
in nature, engrafted into the British constitution as a fundamental law, and ever held sacred and irrevocable 
by the subjects within the realm ….”  Quoted in ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 1776-1791 254 (1991).  Also it is not only the broad sense of property as applied to life and liberty 
that makes it central to the civil state.  As John Davies, the British attorney general of Ireland in the early 
1600s, maintained:  “The first and principal cause of making kings was to maintain property and contracts, 
and traffic and commerce among men.”  Quoted in JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 33 (1986). 
105 The formal rules of a property system are easily asserted by the state.  The difficulty lies in the system’s 
fair enforcement, and for this reason nationbuilders need to educate the social importance of the property 
system at all levels of society.  Cf. DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 223 (urging that “we must make represented 
systems [like property] simpler and more transparent and work hard to make people understand them”). 
106 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.  See also DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 215 (citing that the 
gross domestic product of Russia declined 41 percent from 1990 to 1997). 
107 See, e.g., Testimony of Minxin Pei before the House International Relations Committee, FDCH 
Congressional Testimony, April 30, 1998, available in NEXIS, News Group File (stating that the 
development of the legal system “has become one of the most important institutional changes in China 
since the late 1970s”).  Unfortunately, China’s property system is still quite weak and corruption in both the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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political and economic spheres is prevalent.  See JULIA KWONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 
IN CHINA (1997). 
108 E.g., see the statement of Samuel Adams, supra note 104. 
109 In other words, whatever the historical usage of the term “property,” at some level that usage meant one 
could exclude others —including the state—from a resource, and only inasmuch as one could legally 
exclude others do we have the essential meaning of property.  That over the centuries new resources (e.g., 
trade secrets and business goodwill) came to be protected by property does not reflect change in the term’s 
core meaning, only the specific resources to which property applies have changed. 
110 For the proposition that property is a moral right, see generally, ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE 
AND UTOPIA (1974); MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982).  Note that this essay is not 
asserting property as a moral right.  It merely argues to nationbuilders that a strong property system 
produces the maximum potential for national prosperity and personal liberty. 
111 E.g., the statement of Samuel Adams, supra note 104.  Only a few years later, Alexander Hamilton 
maintained that “a principle cause of the Union” was to protect “the sacred rights of private property.”  
Quoted in Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System 
of the Early American Republic, 1980 WISC. L. REV. 1135, 1142.  Accord Carol M. Rose, Property and 
Expropriation:  Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1 (stating that “no taxation 
without representation” is “fundamentally about taking property without consent”). 
112 REID, supra note 104, at 40 (asserting that property encompassed “the entire American constitutional 
case against parliamentary taxation”); SCHLATTER , supra note 45, at 188. (“Behind the slogan, ‘no taxation 
without representation,’ stood the Lockean theory of property.”). 
113 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in PROPERTY, MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 
39, 53 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Basil Blackwell 1978) (1692). 
114 This view is basic to Adam Smith, who saw the competitive self-interests of sellers in the marketplace 
as an “invisible hand” guiding the best goods at the lowest prices to buyers. 
115 I am calling what follows a “story” because there is no current way to prove it through scientific 
experiment.  Nonetheless, the “story” is consistent with the evidence we do know. 
116 Textbooks asserting that basic human behaviors reflect evolutionary development include DAVID M. 
BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:  THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (1999); JOHN CARTWRIGHT, 
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2000); and STEVEN J.C. GAULIN and DONALD H. MCBURNEY, 
PSYCHOLOGY, AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (2001).  The hypothesis is that our basic human behaviors 
today reflect what served us well in small group hunter-gatherer living.  E.g., GAULIN & MCBURNEY, id at 
90 (“To put it plainly, our psychological adaptations are those of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers.”).  The use 
of evolutionary psychology to illuminate problems of law and jurisprudence has already begun.  See, e.g., 
JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE:  PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF 
MODERN DARWINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS (1989); MARGARET GRUDER, LAW AND THE 
MIND:  BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991); Owen D. Jones, Law and Evolutionary 
Biology:  Obstacles and Opportunities, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 (1994).  The Society for 
Evolutionary Analysis in Law holds regular academic conferences and maintains a website with a source 
bibliography at www.sealsite.org. 
117 E.g., David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences:  Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 
37 Cultures, 12 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 1 (1989) (asserting that “[i] ndividuals lacking favored 
[mating] characteristics tend to become no one’s ancestors”).  Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A 
FREE SOCIETY:  RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 117 (1998) (“Where 
resources are scarce, disinterested generosity is not a viable strategy for survival.…[T] he pure altruist 
keeps a smaller and smaller share of the world’s stock, until the retained share is insufficient to allow for 
survival or reproduction of its own kind.”). 
118 The point is that these general behaviors are basic to individual survival and procreation and that when 
suppressed they negatively affect the direction of additional resourceful effort. 
119 Note that the death of offspring is by far the most significant limitation on passing one’s genes to the 
future, the death of related kin being the other limitation.  The concept of the “selfish gene” that shapes William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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human behavior to perpetuate its future provides the principal basis for evolutionary psychology.  An 
extensive discussion is found in CARTWRIGHT, supra note 116, at 57-90. 
120 E.g., BUSS, supra note 116, at 104 (“The evolution of female preference for males offering resources 
may be the most ancient and pervasive basis for female choice in the animal kingdom.”).  Buss applies this 
conclusion to humans based on his study of over 10,000 individuals in thirty-seven cultures.  Id at 108-09. 
121 DAVID P. BARISH and JUDITH EVE LIPTON, THE MYTH OF MONOGOMY:  FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY IN 
ANIMALS AND PEOPLE 132 (2001) (“Men …accumulate property [resources] — as well as prestige and 
power of other sorts — so as to attract women.”); E.g., DAVID M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE 47 
(1994) (“Men strive to control resources and exclude other men from resources to fulfill women’s mating 
preferences.  In human evolutionary history, men who fail to accumulate resources failed to attract 
mates.”).  Resources are thus vital to both genders, not only for self-survival but for the mating process that 
leads to procreation and passes the genes from one generation to the next.  Cf. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY 
AND FREEDOM 71 (1999) (maintaining that “the leading causes of human acquisitiveness [are] the need of 
territory and of objects with which to sustain oneself and to procreate”). 
122 PIPES, id at 86.  Larger forms of human social organization such as the tribe, city state, and nation did 
not begin to coalesce until the advent of agriculture approximately 10,000 years ago.  Nigel Nicholson, 
Evolutionary Psychology, Toward a New View of Human Nature, 50 HUM. REL.1053, 1060 (1997).  The 
territories that hunter-gatherers controlled were like lifeboats in the sense of having limited, non-
agricultural, food resources, and the various bands were likely zealous in protecting “their” territorial 
resources from the predations of strangers.  The implication is that during virtually all of human 
development, strong behaviors of acquiring and defending resources made one more likely to pass genes to 
subsequent generations, behaviors that are still with us.  Sharing behavior is perhaps also part of our 
behavioral heritage, but its beneficiaries are usually our immediate associates, especially our relatives, and 
extensive sharing is not common with strangers, even our fellow countrymen.  Compassionate sharing 
should certainly be encouraged and taught both through the educational system and moral exhortation, but 
it is likely that only coercion could induce people to part with even half of their disposable incomes to 
alleviate the suffering of the 30,000 children worldwide who die daily from largely preventable disease and 
hunger.  See supra note 12.  Those individuals who act with continuous compassion throughout their lives 
to relieve the suffering of general humanity are usually rare enough to be accorded sainthood.  Cf. EDWARD 
O. WILSON:  CONSILIENCE:  THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 277 (1998) (stating that “true compassion is a 
commodity in chronically short supply”). 
123 The considerable extent of sharing in small-group societies is frequently discussed in PROPERTY 
RELATIONS, RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION (C. M. Hann ed., 1998).  Professor Epstein 
believes that self-interested resource behavior can lead to cooperation and reciprocal sharing.  EPSTEIN, 
supra note 117, at 18:   
  The theory of individual self-interest is not only a theory of conflict 
            and competition; it is one of cooperation as well.  The organism that  
            goes it alone has no allies to fall back upon when things go bad, and  
            is blocked from engaging in any projects that require the coordination  
            of two or more actors.  The logic of self-interest does not, cannot,  
            ignore the gains from cooperation in order to maximize only those  
            gains from competition and aggression. 
The theory of individual self-interest is similar to —although not exactly the same as—the story about why 
sexual selection pressures have evolved behavior that make it difficult for humans to share a significantly 
large percentage of their resources with strangers. 
124 The primary cite for kinship effects on social behavior like sharing is W. D. Hamilton, The Genetical 
Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 THEORETICAL BEHAVIOR 1 (1964).  See generally supra note 116. 
125 Cf.  EPSTEIN, supra note 117, at 17. (“Only the most naïve form of human exceptionalism could lead us 
to believe that [evolutionary] forces that operate on all living creatures, from single-cell organisms to 
primates, cease as if by magic to exert their influence on human beings.  Traits that natural selection has 
molded for eons do not disappear without a trace .…”).  Further, humans tend not to be conscious of how William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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their behavior is shaped by the adaptation of their genes to evolutionary forces.  Douglas A. Terry, Don’t 
Forget About Reciprocal Altruism:  A Critical Review of the Evolutionary Jurisprudence Movement 34 
CONN. L. REV. 477, 479 (2002).  Thus, that we are not consciously aware, for instance, of how we have 
been shaped to work harder for ourselves and our families than for others makes it even more difficult for 
us to suppress this evolutionary propensity and to share according to the needs of the larger society because 
it seems to go against the very nature of ourselves. 
126 Of course, merely that individual behavior is natural does not mean that society should encourage it, and 
there may be behaviors that are “deeply embedded” in human nature which we do not wish to encourage, 
such as the violent expression of anger and jealousy.  If acquisitiveness is such a behavior, why not just 
teach people to suppress acquisitiveness like we teach them to suppress the expression of anger and 
jealousy?  The problem is that in suppressing acquisitiveness connected to resource development and 
production (which is most acquisitiveness not connected with robbery and theft) we reduce the incentive to 
develop and produce in the first instance, a side effect not present when we teach people to manage their 
socially negative emotions.  Suppressing acquisitiveness also does not encourage additional voluntary 
sharing with strangers; more likely it lessens sharing as the potential for acquiring new resources is 
reduced. 
127 This point is critical to the understanding of why if a nation wishes to produce more of a resource, it 
should establish a property in the resource.  The reason is that through exchange, greater production of 
resources makes for a more prosperous society as additional goods (and services) become available and 
competition lowers prices. 
128 A market for the efficient exchange of resources will emerge organically from a strong property system, 
although the reverse is not true, indicating that property is fundamental for a prosperity-maximizing private 
market.  See Greenspan, infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
129 Bethell, supra note 89, at 8.  Cf. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 315 
(Martin E. Marty, ed., Penguin Bks. 1982) (1902) (asserting that “the instinct of ownership is fundamental 
in man’s nature”).  In pursuing the aim of a reductionary effort of moderate length, I will not attempt here 
to answer all of the objections that may be raised to this story of human nature and its implications for the 
legal institution of property.  Suffice it to say that I believe the story holds as true for a shareholder’s 
ownership of a few shares of stock in Nike as for her ownership of her toothbrush or her personal 
photographs. 
130 DE SOTO, supra note 35, at 8 (asserting “that Westerners take this mechanism [property] so completely 
for granted that they have lost all awareness of its existence”).  De Soto expresses concern that “there 
always remains the possibility that the West might damage the source of its own strength” by forgetting the 
necessary legal basis for its prosperity.  Id. 
131 For a series of cites to this effect quoting or referencing presidents, foreign ministers, treasury 
secretaries, the G-7 finance ministers, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, numerous journalists, and others, see Reed, supra note 4, at notes 
1-10 and accompanying text.  A slightly optimistic fact suggesting that property systems worldwide are 
strengthening is that the proportion of those living in global poverty dropped from 29 percent to 23 percent 
during the 1990s.  Statistical Snapshot of a World Divided by Poverty, Irish Times, July 24, 2002 (available 
in LEXIS, News Group File) (citing the United Nations report Human Development). 
132 ISIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xli (1969) (noting that whereas the Greeks may have enjoyed 
“a great measure of what we should today call individual liberty, … that the notion had not explicitly 
emerged, and was therefore not central to Greek culture”). 
133 One of the best accounts of property’s relation to the Charter of Liberties is BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001).  Although the 
discussion that follows in this essay centers on the common law tradition, note that in the civil law 
tradition, property and liberty were also spoken of in the same terms.  For instance, the Austrian Civil Code 
stated that “property is the liberty to do with the substances and uses of a thing according to one’s wants 
and desires and to exclude every other person therefrom.”  Quoted in RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND 
CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 105 (1914); FREDERIC BASTIAT, 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 109-110 (Seymour Cain trans., Foundation for Economic 
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fruits of one’s labor, the right to work, to exercise one’s faculties, according to one’s own understanding, 
without the state intervening otherwise than by its protective action —this is what is meant by liberty”); 
Jean Baechler, Liberty, Property, and Equality (John W. Chapman trans.) in NOMOS XXII:  PROPERTY 269, 
287 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (a French political theorist maintaining that “[l] 
iberty and property form an indissoluable unity in society and politics”). 
134 Quoted id. at 7. 
135 Quoted id. at 11. 
136 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 59, at 138. 
137 Id.at 129. 
138 Id.at 134. 
139 Id.at 138. 
140 Id.at 125 (emphasis added). 
141 Supra note 3. 
142 Supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
143 Supra note 3. 
144 REID, supra note 104, at 33. 
145 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, THE AUTHORITY TO 
TAX 27 (1987).  Another view connecting liberty and property, which is examined at length in GREGORY S. 
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY (1997), maintains that property is necessary to liberty because it 
enables individuals to hold resources apart from state control and thus be independent of the state, a 
condition that facilitates “liberty.”  In a somewhat different vein, Professor Reid is suggesting that many 
colonists regarded liberty and property as semantically co-extensive so that one could say that she had a 
property in resources or a liberty in resources rather interchangeably.  My reductionary assertion concurs 
with the latter view, recognizing that although liberty and property have been often used as different terms, 
even in colonial times, they have a deep identity in their exclusionary nature, and the distinction between 
the facultative resources of the person and the non-facultative resources developed or acquired through the 
productions of the facultative resources is not significant when attempting to explain Western freedom and 
prosperity to nationbuilders.  Cf. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 21-22 (1939) 
(asserting that “the meaning of property” is “the liberty of expected activity in acquiring, using and 
disposing of things” and stating that property and liberty are united “in an identical concept”); John O. 
McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 63 
(1996) (quoting Trenchard and Gordon from Cato’s Letters, one of the most popular and respected sources 
of ideas during the colonial era:  “By Liberty, I understand the Power which every Man has over his own 
Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruits of his Labour, Art, and Industry …”). 
146 Quoted in REID, supra note 104, at 33. 
147 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, PREAMBLE. 
148 MADISON, supra note 3. 
149 Behind some of the most important issues of the Revolution, like taxation without representation, “stood 
the Lockean theory of property.”  SCHLATTER, supra note 112 at  188.  The Second Treatise contained 
Locke’s most developed thoughts on property.  It is also undeniable that Blackstone and his Commentaries 
played an important role in the legal and philosophical education of those who dominated the 
Revolutionary Era, but Blackstone, too, was influenced by Locke.  GOTTFRIED DIETZE, IN DEFENSE OF 
PROPERTY 27 (1963) (stating that Locke’s ideas “were assumed by the outstanding commentator on English 
law, Blackstone”). 
150 For example, Locke asserted that one was “a proprietor of his own person.”  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hacket Pub. Co., Inc. 1980) (1690).  Before Locke, 
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ed., reprinted Penguin Classics 1985) (1651) (“Of things held in Propriety, those that are dearest to a man 
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COUNT DESTUTT TRACY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 53 (Thomas Jefferson trans., reprint 
Augustus M. Kelly 1970) (1817) (maintaining that persons “have each one the inalienable, incommutable, 
and inevitable property, in their individuality and its faculties … .”).   
Owning oneself and having the free use of one’s faculties is for practical purposes difficult to distinguish 
from liberty, and “it is sometimes said that the idea of self-ownership stands at the heart of all liberalism.”  
JONATHAN WOLFE, ROBERT NOZICK:  PROPERTY, JUSTICE AND THE MINIMAL STATE 8 (1991).  However, 
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which is a due process concept dating back to the Charter of Liberties.  See SIEGAN, supra note 133. 
152 Quoted in REID, supra note 104, at 45. 
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Wright ed., 1961). 
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“the laws that determine the rights of shareholders, including minority shareholders.”). 
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Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720 (2000).  These problems are extreme examples of problems 
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managers (agents).  See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 324 (1993). 
156 Fox & Heller, id at 1741. 
157 Fox & Heller, id at 1742. 
158 STIGLITZ, supra note 34, at 157 (stating that “[t] he IMF told Russia to privatize as fast as possible; how 
privatization was done was viewed as secondary”). 
159 For the shape and general development of the Chinese legal system, see Peter Howard Corne, Creation 
and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369 (2002).  For the legal reforms in China that 
“lay the legal foundations of a market-economy,” see Minxin Pei, Is China Democratizing?, Foreign 
Affairs (Jan., 1998), available in LEXIS, News Group File.  Note the 387 percent increase in commercial 
litigation cases between 1986 to 1996 and the growth of “a relatively strong sense of rights, especially 
property rights.”  Id.  In a 1993 poll of over 5000 respondents in China, 78 percent agreed with the 
statement, “Private property is sacred and must not be violated.”  Id. A slightly different view of property in 
China, but one which emphasizes the importance of bottom-up legal and economic development is Harry 
Williams, Property Rights and Legal Reform in Township and Village Enterprises in China, 2 ASIAN-
PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 227 (2001). 
160 Text of Greenspan Speech to Woodrow Wilson Center Award Dinner, Bloomberg News, June 6, 1997 
(available in LEXIS, News File Group.) 
161 That after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy suffered a precipitous decline, see DE 
SOTO, supra note 35.  A slower, bottom-up approach, beginning with a secure property in small land 
ownership and basic entrepreneurial activities like retail sales and progressing only over a ten-to-fifteen 
year period toward privatization of large state-controlled manufacturing and mining might have allowed 
time for Russians to adapt to a regime of property under the rule of law. 
162 JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT:  PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND 
TRAIL 359 (1997). 
163 Of the importance of contract in conveying propertied resources, see, e.g., id at 84 and 116.  As to the 
relative absence of theft see id. at 338 (“Rarely do we encounter emigrants [on the overland trail] saying William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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that because the property of others had been lost, destroyed, or exhausted, their own property might be 
stolen.”).  Furthermore, “people on the overland trail expected that their lost or strayed property would be 
returned.”  Id. at 259. 
164 Only one account “has been discovered of emigrants threatening to kill for property.”  Id. at 346.  
Professor Reid identified just four reports of threats being made to obtain an owner’s resources.  Id. at 346.  
In fact, “[i] f a group of men were starving they might have no recourse except to kill a horse, but the 
owner, not the majority, made the decision.  No custom of the trail or general expectation nullified the 
exclusiveness of personal rights.”  Id. at 352-53. 
165 See Reed, supra note 4, at mm.11-12 and accompanying text. 
166 Id. 
167 Robert J. S. Ross and Anita Chan, From North-South to South-South, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 8 (Sept.- 
Oct., 2002) (identifying groups concerned with environmental and labor issues as picketing the World 
Trade Organization). 
168 The fear is grounded both in concern about the environment and workers in developing countries and in 
concern about maintaining jobs in the developed nations.  See, e.g., Rowan Callick, Sweatshops as Steps in 
Right Direction, Australian Financial Rev., Aug. 3, 2002 (available in LEXIS, News Group File).  
Companies that seek out and locate in the country that controls their various activities the least are said to 
engage in “regulatory arbitrage.”  Douglas M. Branson, Fundamental Themes in Business Law Education, 
Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 678 (2000).  Professor Branson 
explains: 
  A multinational may locate activities in nation-states in which 
  regulation poses little or no obstacle to the corporation’s activities. 
  For example, the multinational may locate a polluting facility in a  
  former Soviet republic in which environmental law enforcement is  
not only lax but nonexistent.  The same multinational might locate  
a “knockoff” manufacturing facility in a nation with a large market  
for the product and little or no protection for intellectual property,  
such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  With labor intensive manufacturing the muti-
nationals may seek out a developing nation  
eager for employment at any cost and locate a facility there. 
Id. 
169 E.g., A. JAMES CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 20.23 (1952) (stating that holders of concurrent 
property interests, which include tenants in common, are liable to their co-tenants for waste). 
170 33 USC § 1365 (2002) (Clean Water Act section stating that “any citizen may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf … against any person … who is alleged to be in violation of … an affluent standard or 
limitation under this Act … .”).  The similar Clean Air Act section is 42 USC § 7604 (2002). 
171 What is being suggested here is that everyone have a property interest in environmental resources to an 
extent defined by law and thus be able to bring action to exclude others from interfering with these 
resources in ways that directly, materially, and adversely affect human health.  Compare this suggestion to 
stakeholder approaches to corporate governance discussed in Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in 
Comparative Perspective:  Prospects for Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5 (2000).  The 
advantage to protecting the environment or other “stakeholder” interests through property is that this 
approach focuses the resolution of resource issues through the single legal concept that is the hub of 
Western legal systems.  There becomes no need to balance environmental stakeholder interests against 
corporate property interests.  Both interests are property interests, and the issue for resolution is whether the 
resource use of one owner (the polluter) interferes with the equal resource right (e.g., breathing clean air) of 
another owner.  A tort law variation of this property approach simply acknowledges the property interest of 
people in themselves and recognizes polluter-caused environmental health threats as violating that right and 
causing injury, thus entitling those injured to compensation and/or injunction. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 528 
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172 Although this property assignment is unlikely in the near future, it is not administratively far-fetched, 
and already a less comprehensive variation of it — emissions trading — is taking place.  The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 recognized such trading in sulfur dioxide.  42 U.S.C. § 7407 (1994).  For discussion 
of emissions trading, see GARY C. BRYNER, NEW TOOLS FOR IMPROVING GOVERNMENT REGULATION:  AN 
ASSESSMENT OF EMISSIONS TRADING AND OTHER MARKET-BASED REGULATORY TOOLS (1999); 
EMISSIONS TRADING:  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY’S NEW APPROACH (Richard F. Kosobad ed., 2000).  In 
October, 2002, the European Parliament approved a greenhouse gas emissions trading policy to achieve 
reductions required under the Kyoto Protocol.  Octane Week, Oct. 14, 2002 (available in LEXIS, News 
Group File). 
173 Supra, notes 99-101 and accompanying text.  See also Reed, supra note 4, at nn. 42-56 and 
accompanying text.  Unfortunately, not all of the environmental problems of the developing world derive 
from lack of adequate corporate governance.  For example, the absence of basic sanitation is a major 
environmental problem with over 90 percent of the sewage generated being discharged with no treatment, a 
result estimated to account for 80 percent of all illnesses in the developing world.  William L. Andreen, 
Environmental Law and International Assistance:  The Challenge of Strengthening Environmental Law in 
the Developing World, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 17 (2000). 
174 Of course, the common law divides the right of exclusion into the rights to exclude others from injuring 
one’s person (including one’s health) and from injuring one’s “property” (external or non-facultative 
resources).  See generally I BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES and II BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra 
note 60.  Nationbuilders striving to understand what about Western legal systems catalyzed great 
production of resources need not follow the convoluted forms of action following historically from this 
division.  Like Madison, supra note 3, they may conceptualize the right of exclusion as applying both to 
one’s person (originally possessed facultative resources) and one’s external, non-facultative resource 
acquired without coercion, theft, or fraud as “property.”  In this context, a worker’s health is a resource that 
is within the exclusive private sphere of what is “proper” to a person, i.e., what one has “property” in. 
175 It cannot be overemphasized that the advocacy of property as a national wealth-maximizing  institution 
is not an apology for international laissez-faire corporate bucaneerism, environmental degradation, nor 
worker abuse.  Not market fundamentalism but the rule of law is basic to a strong property system. 
176 This statement acknowledges that for property to exist the state must specify which resources property   
protects, especially as to intangible resources.  The property in trade secrets, invention, and pollution 
emission exist only as the state recognizes these things as resources it wishes to encourage through the 
incentive of exclusionary right.  In the West the assignment of property to protect various new resources is 
puzzling or controversial only because most resources, especially tangible resources, have been so long 
protected by property that we forget that the law must initially recognize who gets what, and thus the 
current assignments seem “natural.” 
177 Like freedom of speech, property is a right, the right to exclude others from resources limited at any 
moment of time.  Treating race, gender, or age as an originally possessed resource that one can exclude 
others from interfering with by employment discrimination is not illogical if what nationbuilders wish to do 
is give incentive for more employment non-discrimination. 
178 See Vandevelde, supra note 5.  
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